Do Old Habits Die Hard? Central Banks and the Bretton Woods Gold Puzzle
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944-1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following r...
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| Формат: | Электронная книга |
| Язык: | English |
| Публикация: |
Washington, D.C.
International Monetary Fund,
2019.
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| Серии: | IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;
no. 19/161. |
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| Online-ссылка: | EBSCOhost Перейти в каталог НБ ТГУ |
| Итог: | Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944-1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers. |
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| Объем: | 1 online resource (32 pages) |
| ISBN: | 1498326773 9781498326773 1513508873 9781513508870 |
| ISSN: | 1018-5941 |